This paper is a continuation of our papers [61 and [71 and is concerned with a continuous time Markov game in which the state space is countable and the action spaces of player I and player n are compact metric spaces. In the game, the players continuously observe the state of the system and then choose actions. As a result, the reward is paid to player I from player n and the system moves to a new state by the known transition rates. Then we consider the optimization problem to maximize the total expected discounted gain for player I and, at the same time, to minimize the total expected loss for player n as the game proceeds to the infinite future.
Introduction and Summary
In recent years, a considerable attention has been given to games in order to solve practical problems in management science and, at the same time, the game theory has been actively investigated. The concept of a Markov game was first formulated by Shapley in [4] . And, by introducing a discount factor and using the results in dynamic programming, Maitra and Parthasarathy investigated a Markov game with an infinite horizon in [3] . In this paper, we consider con- 17 
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Continuous Time Markov Games
tinuous time one with a discount factor. Such a game has been hardly found, as far as the present authors a~e aware, except this paper. Then we use the results with relation to the continuous time Markov decision process given, mainly, in [2] .
We give a formulation of our game. We determine "a continuous time Markov game" by a sextuple (S, A, B, q, r, et). Here S is a countable set labeled (1, 2, 3, ••• ), the set of states of a system; A is a non-empty Borel subset of a complete separable metric space, the set of actions available to player I; B is a non-empty Borel subset of a complete separable metric space, the set of actions available to player n; q is a transition rate function which governs the law of motion of the system and is a bounded function q(·li, a, b) on S for each triple (i, a, b) £ S x Ax B; r, a reward function, is a bounded measurable function on S x A x B; et, a discount fac:tor, is a positive number.
In this game, player I and player IT continuously observe the state of the system and classify it into one of the possible states i £ S and then player I and player IT choose actions a £ A and b £ B, respectively. As a consequence of the present states i £ S and the actions a and b chosen by the players, player IT pays player I reward rei, a, b) unit of money and the system moves to a new state j £ S, which is governed by the transition rate q(j li, a, b). Then, our optimization problem is to maximize the total expected discounted gain for player I and, at the same time, to minimize the total expected discounted loss for player IT as the game proceeds to the infinite future.
We assume that strategies for player I and player IT are independent of the past history of the system and depend only on the present state of the system. Such a strategy 7T = 7T(t) for player I is specified by a family {llt}' where {llt} is a function llt(Mli) of i, t and M such that for each i£ Sand t £ [0, co) it is a probability measure llt(oli) on the measurable space (A, B(A» where B(A) is the er-field generated by the metric on A, and that for each i £ S and M £ B(A) it is a Iq(ili, t, 7f, 0) 1:5 M.
We write the transition rate matrix corresponding to 7f and 0 as Q(t, 7f, 0) = {q(j I j, 7f, 0) ; i, j e: S} and if 7f and 0 are! stationary strategies, we write Q(7f, 0) instead of Q(t, 7f, 0).
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The existence of a unique transition function corresponding to a given transition rate matrix was shown by Feller for arbitrary state space, and Reuter and Ledermann gave a simpler aprroach suitable for denumerable state space.
These authors considered the case where the transition rate is continuous in t.
In our situation, the transition rate is only measurable in t. In this case, using the approach of Reuter and Ledermann, Kakumann showed in [1] 
where I is the infinite identity matrix.
It was also shown that a measurable Harkov process {X(t, 7f, 0) ; t~ s} corresponding to the stochastic matrix F(s, t, 7f, 0) exists and is well-behaved.
Then, for a pair of Markov strategies '(7f, 0), Q(t, 7f, 0) which governs the law of motion of the system, is an infinitesinml generator of the process This common quantity as a function on S is called the value function of the game.
The Existence of Optimal Stationary Strategies
In this section, we shall show the existence of optimal stationary strategies. First, in order to prove main results, we assume the following: 
-Ilull
Then, from (2.1), we obtain for all n;::N, .;l£A and b£B, 
(i). fl E P A A E P B
A E P B\l E P A Moreover, since P A and P B are compact, it was shown in [3] that sup and inf in (2.3) can be replaced by max and min, respectively. Then, there exist maps fl* and A* from S into P A and P B , respectively, such that for each iE Sand uE C(S),
In order to prove the main result, the following theorem is important.
Theorem 2.1. There exists a function v E C(S) such that for each i E S,
where a is the discount factor.
Proof. First, for each \lE P A andAEP B , we define a new one-step transition probability matrix P(\l, A) with relation to Q(\l, A) by (2.6) whose (i, j)th element is given by
where M is the positive number in Assumption 1. Then, since P A and P B are compact metric spaces and rei, \l, A) and Ep(jli, fl, A)U(j) are continuous function 
